ZONING-ORDINAcE REQUIRING

DEDICATION OF PROPERTY TO

CITY FOR STREET WIDENING PURPOSES AS CONDITION PRECEDENT TO OBTAINING BUILDING PERMIT HELD NOT A TAKING
OF PROPERTY WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION. Southern Pacific

Co. v. City of Los Angeles (Cal. App. 1966).
Southern Pacific Company applied for a building permit to construct a warehouse on its property, the area being zoned M-3 (heavy
industrial), a classification permitting such construction. The City of
Los Angeles refused to issue the permit unless Southern Pacific complied with the municipal code requirement that no building should
be erected on any lot in an R-3 or less restrictive zone abutting a major
or secondary highway, unless the highway had been dedicated and
improved to the full width as contemplated in the master plan of
community development.'
In the mandamus proceedings 2 to compel issuance of the permit,
the trial court rejected Southern Pacific's claim that the code requirement was unconstitutional on its face, and as applied to the specific
facts at bar. On appeal to the District Court of Appeal, held, affirmed. Southern Pacific Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 242 Adv. Cal.
App. 21, 51 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1966) ipetition for hearingdenied, (June
29, 1966).
In affirming, the District Court reasoned that: (1) Since the appellant sought to change the character of the land and reap the
benefits therefrom, it ought to meet all reasonable requirements imposed by the ordinance; (2) the necessity and form of zoning regulations is primarily a legislative function, to be tested not by what the
courts may think of the wisdom or necessity of the legislation, but
rather, whether there is any reasonable basis in fact to support the
legislative determination of the regulation's wisdom and necessity;
(3) the requirement of dedication of the land was proper under the
police power of the state, and was not an unconstitutional taking
1 Los AwGELES, CAL., MuNICIPAL CODE § 12.37. No building or structure shall be

erected or enlarged, and no building permit shall be issued therefor, on any lot in any
R3 or less restrictive zone (as such order of restrictiveness is set forth in Subsection B
of Section 12.23), if such lot abuts a major or secondary highway, unless the one-half
of the highway which is located on the same side of the center of the highway as such
lot has been dedicated and improved for the full width of the lot so as to meet the
standards for such highway provided in Subsection H of this section, or such dedication and improvement has been assured to the satisfaction of the Bureau of Right of
Way and Land and the City Engineer, respectively ...
2 CAL. CODE CiV. PRoc. § 1085 authorizes a writ of mandate, "to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right ... to which he is entitled .... "
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without just compensation, as the condition was reasonably related to
the increased traffic that would be generated by the warehouse; and,
(4) the ordinance was not repugnant to the equal protection clause
of the federal and state constitutions since the owners in an R-3 or
less restrictive zone3 do not stand in precisely the same relation to the
law as do owners in R-2 zones.
The court drew support for its findings from two California Supreme Court decisions: Ayres v. City Council of City of Los Angeles4
and Bringle v. Board of Supervisors.6 In a 4-2 decision, the Ayres
court held that ordinances requiring a subdivider to dedicate a portion of the land for street purposes were proper, since he sought to
acquire the advantages of lot subdivision. He therefore had a correlative duty of complying with reasonable conditions for the design,
improvement, and restrictive use of the land, including reasonable
access by streets.6
In Bringle, the court deemed reasonable the right of a zoning board
to condition the granting of a variance with a requirement that the
party seeking the variance dedicate to the county, without compensation, an easement for a right of way for street widening purposes.
The underlying rationale of the Bringle decision was that because a
variance sanctions a deviation from the standard set by the general
zoning ordinance, the granting of such a variance rests largely in the
discretion of the granting body. Hence, conditions may be attached
to the variance in order to preserve the general purposes and intent
7
of the zoning ordinance.
By analogy, the Southern Pacific court aligned its decision with
Ayres and Bringle, stating:
[S]ince the courts have recognized that the Legislature may prop-

erly insist upon dedication of the means of access-and that, of
necessity, implies sufficient access-both in subdivision and nonsubdivision cases, a flexible police power may require the dedication
3 "Less restrictive zone" refers to areas zoned for multiple dwellings and commercial
and manufacturing activities. Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 12.04.
4 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).

5
6
Cal.
that
may

54 Cal. 2d 86, 351 P.2d 765, 4 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1960).
But see Wine v. Council of City of Los Angeles, 177 Cal. App. 2d 157, 171, 2
Rptr. 94, 103 (1960) ("The Ayres Case is not authority for the proposition
the subdivider may be required to pay the cost of improving offsite streets, nor
such meaning be ascribed to the statute."); see generally 34 Ops. CAL. Ar'y
GEN. 119 (1959) and 22 Ops. CAL. ATfY GEN. 168 (1953).
7 But see 13 HASTINGS L.J. 401 (1962) (criticizing the result reached in Bringle).

1967]

RECENT CASES

under the drcumstances here, when the need
of additional access,
8
therefor arises.

t

The analogy seems questionable since Ayres involved a conditional
privilege associated with the Subdivision Map Act, and Bringle dealt
with a request for a zoning variance. In these situations, the approval
of the subdivision map and the granting of the variance rest largely
in the discretion of the appropriate governmental authority. 9
To thus justify the analogy to Ayres and Bringle, the court must
begin with the premise that the erection of a warehouse, in an area
zoned for such construction, is likewise a privilege to which conditions
precedent may be attached. This would seem repugnant to the constitutional provision which guarantees to all men the inalienable right
to acquire, possess, and protect property.'0 Granted this right is subject to the police power, but nonetheless that power should not be
used as a subterfuge to acquire property desired for public use." In
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,'12 Mr. Justice Holmes observed that
the constitutional protection of private property presupposes that it
is wanted for public use. When this protection is qualified by the
police power, the tendency is to expand the application of that power
until private property rights disappear. However, such taking without
just compensation is forbidden by the fifth and fourteenth amend13
ments to the Constitution.
The Southern Pacific court, relying on ConsolidatedRock Products
Co. v. City of Los Angeles,14 held the Pennsylvania Coal case inapplicable since it had been decided before the principles of comprehensive zoning were established. However, as pointed out by one
writer: "It is significant

. . .

that the United States Supreme Court

8 242 Adv. Cal. App. at 28, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
9 See Beverly Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 2d 552, 254 P.2d 865 (1953);
City of Buena Park v. Boyar, 186-Cal. App. 2d 61, 8 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1960).
1o

CAL. CONsr. art. I, § 1.

11

Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958).
12 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
13 Id. at 415.
14 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962). Consolidated was an

action to enjoin the city from enforcing a zoning restriction that prevented rock and
gravel operations on plaintiff's property. In affirming the district court's holding that
the restriction was valid, the California Supreme Court indicated that the primary

purpose of comprehensive zoning was to protect the general public from uses of
property that would prove injurious to them. The court at page 524 then cited with
approval In re Kelso, 147 Cal. 609, 612, 82 Pac. 241, 242 (1905) ("So far as such

use of one's property may be had without injury to others it is a lawful use which
cannot be absolutely prohibited ....
"'). (Emphasis added.)
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cited the Pennsylvania Coal decision with approval, in a case involving municipal ordinances and gravel pits, within a month following
the decision in Consolidated."15
Southern Pacific claimed further that the ordinance violated the
equal protection clause of the federal and state constitutions. Appellant cited People v. Western FruitGrowers,Inc.,1" which declared
that a law
is special legislation if it confers particular privileges, or imposes
peculiar disabilities or burdensome conditions, in the exercise of a
common right, upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from the
general body of those 17who stand in precisely the same relation to
the subject of the law.

Southern Pacific argued that because the ordinance did not require
owners in an R-2 zone to dedicate a portion of their land should they
desire to erect a duplex, the ordinance imposed a peculiar disability
on owners in an R-3 or less restrictive zone, persons standing in the
same relation to the subject of the law. The court rejected this contention, reasoning that R-3 owners do not stand in precisely the same
relation to the law as do R-2 owners, since a new duplex in an R-2
district does not generate the same increase in traffic that would result if a new warehouse were built in an R-3 or less restrictive area.
It is interesting to note that the ordinance itself requires no reasonable
relationship between the proposed construction and the condition
imposed. With certain limited exceptions,"' the ordinance establishes
a blanket restriction on any construction and does not distinguish
projects not generating an increase in traffic.10
Assuming the distinction between R-2 and R-3 owners' relationships to the law to be valid, other possible difficulties are posed. For
example, under the terms of the ordinance, other R-3 owners whose
property does not abut a major or secondary highway would not be
required to dedicate land, even though they might build larger warehouses and generate even greater traffic on the same street. Furthermore, those owners of land abutting the same highway who refrain
15 50 CALIF. L. REV. 896, 899 n.21 (1962).
16 22 Cal. 2d 494, 140 P.2d 13 (1943).
17 Id. at 506, 140 P.2d at 19-20.
18 Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 12.37(B)

(exempting additions and

accessory buildings incidental to existing nonresidential buildings, provided the
total cumulative floor area does not exceed 200 square feet).
19 It is conceivable that an R-3 owner could construct an addition of only 250
square feet that would not generate additional traffic; yet by the terms of the ordinance,
that owner would nonetheless be required to dedicate land to the city.

1967]

RECENT CASES

from construction until the City acquires the land by eminent domain
proceedings will receive severance damages. These property owners,
having been compensated for their land, are then free to construct
a warehouse or any other facility that might increase the traffic flow.
In a hypothetical five year situation the net result with respect to
several property owners in the R-3 or less restrictive zones might be
this: Prior to any eminent domain proceedings, Southern Pacific, as
an abutting owner, has been required to dedicate its land without
compensation to the city as a condition precedent to building. Adjacent owner B, who waited and received severance damages before
building his warehouse, received just compensation for the taking of
his land, yet now generates possibly even greater traffic from his
newer building. Likewise, adjacent owner C, who built his warehouse
prior to the enactment of the ordinance, received compensation for
his property when it was subsequently taken. Owners D, E, and F,
whose properties are within the same area, but not abutting a major
or secondary highway, could have built at any time during the hypothetical five year period, yet they would not have been required to
dedicate and improve any land, merely because their property, while
in the same area and generating increased traffic, did not happen to
abut a major or secondary highway. Can this be equal protection? It
is submitted that, as among these hypothetical owners and other residents of the city who contribute to the increase of traffic and bring
about the necessity for street widening, the equal protection clause
requires that the land be acquired by eminent domain proceedings
rather than by zoning restrictions.
In the instant case the court pointed out that the City was not
seeking petitioner's land, but rather it was Southern Pacific which was
seeking a permit to build; thus, the proceeding did not involve
eminent domain.20 This was essentially the opinion of the majority
in Ayres.2 1 However, in his dissent, Justice Carter, joined by Justice
Schauer, answered the Ayres majority with some compelling logic:
The majority say that petitioner may not prevail in his contention
that, since the use of the land.. . was contemplated in any event,
the dedication and use reservation requirements in this proceeding
20 242 Adv. Cal. App. at 29, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
21 But see Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1952). Brous
also involved subdivision approval. The court mentioned that if the town wanted to
construct a road across the petitioner's property, it would have to condemn the land

and compensate the owner; but the town had no such desire or design and was merely
conditioning its approval upon compliance with reasonable conditions for the protection of purchasers.
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are unconstitutional as an exercise of the power of eminent domain.
A sufficient answer [say the majority] is that the proceeding here
involved is not one in eminent domain nor is the city seeking to
exercise that power. Why is this a sufficient answer? Is a Court to
be precluded from a determination of whether or not Constitutional
mandates have been disobeyed because of the form a proceeding
takes? It would seem that because the conditions imposed were said
to have been imposed under the police power should not preclude
22
this Court from determining whether or not such was the case.
Eminent domain has been distinguished from the police power by its
underlying purpose. Thus, if the property is taken from the owner
and utilized for some specific public improvement, the proceeding
should be one of eminent domain. In contrast, a regulation or limitation upon the use of the property, for the common good of all the
public, is within the police power. 23 The California Supreme Court
indicated in Rose v. State of California24 that the police power generally operates in the field of regulation, except in cases of emergency
such as conflagration and flood. Applying, these guidelines, it would
seem that the proceeding in the instant case should properly be one
of eminent domain. The purpose of the ordinance is to facilitate the
acquisition of property for a specific public improvement, i.e., the
widening of a public street. The benefits thus derived will inure to
the public generally; and, while the need for wider streets may be
great, the situation can hardly be characterized as the type of
emergency to which the Supreme Court referred.
The test suggested by the Southern Pacific court as to the necessity
and form of the regulation-Is there any reasonable basis in fact to
support the legislative determination of the regulation's wisdom and
necessity ?-is derived from Consolidated Rock. 25 In applying this
test, the court pointed to section 12.02 of the Municipal Code, which
declares the purposes of the comprehensive zoning plan to be: to
lessen congestion on city streets; to facilitate adequate provisions for
community utilities such as transportation; and to promote health,
safety, and the general welfare. With these purposes supplying the
"J'easonable basis" for the legislative determination of the necessity
of the ordinance, the court turned to the question of whether section
12.02 could properly be applied to the instant case. Answering in
the affirmative, the court reviewed evidence presented by the City
22 34 Cal. 2d at 46, 207 P.2d at 10.
23 1 METZENBAUM, LAw OF ZONING 74 (2d

ed. 1955).

24 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942).
25 57 Cal.

2d at 522, 370 P.2d at 346, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 642.

1967]

RECENT CASES

to the effect that the warehouse could be operated on a twenty-four
hour basis, and if so used, more than 1,000 trucks could be accommodated each day. 28 Since the traffic count of the adjacent street was
estimated to reach 50,000 vehicles per day by 1980, the court reasoned
that the widening of even one block would have a beneficial effect on
the overall traffic flow and would, in addition, enhance the value of
27
the appellant's property.
There is a distinction, however, between judicial review of legislative form and judicial determination of the constitutionality of any
particular enactment. While review of form is not within the court's
authority, a decision as to the constitutionality of a particular legislative enactment is a judicial function. 2 Thus, the fact that widened
streets are reasonably necessary in Los Angeles should not preclude
the court from determining whether the ordinance provides a constitutional method of acquiring the necessary land.
Assuming the warehouse will generate an increase of 1,000 trucks
per day, such increase is insignificant compared with either the present
volume of traffic or the projected volume in 1980. The increase in
traffic and the necessity for the widening of the street evolve from
the tremendous growth of the City of Los Angeles, rather than from
Southern Pacific's proposed warehouse, and thus the cost of the
29
widening should not be borne solely by the appellant.
Southern Pacific indicates an expansion of the police power to require the dedication of land through zoning regulations. It extends
the doctrine from the subdivision and variance cases to include the
requirement of dedication where the proposed construction is reasonably related to the condition imposed. Where the court will draw the
28 242 Adv. Cal. App. at 31, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 203

(Appellant had introduced

evidence showing that the warehouse and the type of business were not compatible
with a rapid turnover of goods and trucks and contended that a maximum of 56 trucks
per day was more realistic.).
27 But see Crescent City v. Moran, 25 Cal. App. 2d 133, 77 P.2d 281 (1938) (The
court recognized that while street improvement is a benefit to the abutting owner, it
is secondary, and the general public receives the greater use and benefit.).
28 Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d 38 (1949) ; Pringle
v. City of Chicago, 404 Ill. 473, 478, 89 N.1.2d 365, 367-68 (1949) ("Whether...
[a zoning] ordinance has any such relation [to the public health, safety, morals or
welfare] is subject to review by the courts, and highly injurious restrictions lacking
a basis in the public weal come within the constitutional inhibition against taking
private property for public use without just compensaton.").
29 Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 IIl. 2d 375, 380,
176 NB.2d 799, 801-02 (1961) (In referring to Ayres, the court indicated that a
municipality may not require a subdivider to provide a major thoroughfare, the need
for which stems from the total activity of the community.); Mansfield & Swett v.
Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 AUt. 225 (1938).
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line between police power acquisition and eminent domain is open
to conjecture. It will be interesting to note the result in Sommers v.
City of Los Angeles,30 now on appeal to the Second District Court
of Appeal wherein the applicant desired to remodel a service station
and was required by the same ordinance to dedicate a portion of his
property. It would seem that the limits of police power acquisition
will have to be more dearly defined since service stations do not
usually increase the flow of traffic on an adjacent street, but rather
they tend to service the existing traffic.
Perhaps the limitation expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal is still applicable, even in the days of "comprehensive
zoning":
When this seemingly absolute protection [of private property under
the fifth amendment] is found to be qualified by the police power,
the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification
more and more until at last private property disappears. But that
cannot be accomplished in this way under the Constitution of the
United States.8 1
JAMES B. FRANKLIN
30 Los Angeles Superior Court, No. 859 680.
81

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).

